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CHAPTER 14 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§14.1. Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act: Constitutionality. 
Wolfman v. Modern Life Insurance CO.l raised two questions: (1) 
was the plaintiff assignee of a life insurance policy within the scope 
of the Unauthorized Insurer's Process Act,2 and (2) was the defendant 
unauthorized life insurer denied due process by being subjected to 
the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts by substituted service of 
process under this act? In its finding that the statute "does not re-
quire dealings in the State with more than one person"3 and that 
"the requirements of due process are met by such a statute when the 
only activity in the State relates to the particular policy sued on,"4 
the Supreme Judicial Court indicated how tenuous the connection be-
tween the state and the unauthorized insurer can be and still serve to 
bring the insurer within the jurisdiction of the forum. 
In this case the insurer had been incorporated in New York in 1962 
and the policy sued on was issued in New York in 1964 to a resident 
of Maryland, naming the estate of the insured as beneficiary. The in-
sured, before he had paid the first premium, agreed in Boston to 
assign the policy to the plaintiff, an investment broker. In the course 
of his conversations with the insured in Boston the plaintiff tele-
phoned the insurer at its New York office to confirm that the amount 
of the policy was being reduced from $50,000 to $35,000 to obtain the 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE is Vice-president of Liberty Mutual Insurance Companies, 
Boston, and is an Instructor in Law at Boston College Law School. 
§14.1. ll967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 637, 225 N.E.2d 598. 
2 G.L., c. 175B, §2(a), provides that "any of the following acts in this common-
wealth, effected by mail or otherwise, by an unauthorized foreign or alien insurer: 
(I) the issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this common-
wealth or to corporations authorized to do business therein; (2) the solicitation of 
applications for such contracts; (3) the collection of premiums, membership fees, 
assessments or other considerations for such contracts; or (4) any other transaction 
of business, is equivalent to and shall constitute an appointment by such insurer 
of the commissioner of insurance and his successor or successors in office, to be its 
true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all lawful process in any 
action, suit or proceeding instituted by or on behalf of an insured or beneficiary 
arising out of any such contracts of insurance, and any such act shall be significa-
tion of its agreement that such service of process is of the same legal force and 
validity as personal service of process in this commonwealth upon such insurer." 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 644, 225 N.E.2d at 604. 
4Id. at 645, 225 N.E.2d at 605. 
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policy number and to ascertain the amount of the first premium. On 
that same day the plaintiff mailed to New York the original policy, 
the policy change request, the assignment and a check in payment of 
the first premium. Subsequently, the insurer mailed to Boston an 
acknowledgment of the premium and a copy of the policy change re-
quest and assignment. Thereafter, the plaintiff arranged by mail with 
the insurer's New York office to convert the policy from a quarterly 
payment to an annual payment basis. Following the death of the in-
sured some months later, the plaintiff brought an action on the policy 
under the Unauthorized Insurers' Process Act, to which the defendant 
pleaded a lack of jurisdiction. 
The plaintiff, as assignee of the policy, was the owner of a substan-
tive beneficial interest under the policy, had at the time of its de-
livery a right to sue on the policy and, in consequence, was a 
"beneficiary" within the meaning of that word as used in the substi-
tuted service act. The insurer was within the terms of the statute 
because it delivered a contract of insurance to a resident of the 
Commonwealth, and engaged in the "transaction of [other] business" 
by arranging by mail and telephone for the modification of premium 
payment terms and receipt of premium payments mailed in Boston. 
The insurer's contention that its acts were involuntary and at the in-
stance of, and for the accommodation of, a party other than its insured 
was rejected. In the view of the Court, the requirement of voluntary 
business activity within the state may be met by acts other than 
selling a policy. This insurer could not reasonably have refused to deal 
with the plaintiff without adversely affecting its business. In choosing 
to do business across state lines, it chose to become involved in activi-
ties of the kind in question and was, consequently, electing to avail 
itself of the privilege of conducting business activities in the state 
of the forum. 
§14.2. Motor vehicle insurance: Permissive use. In Scaltreto v. 
Shea1 the plaintiff sought to reach and apply the proceeds of a Massa-
chusetts motor vehicle liability policy in satisfaction of a judgment 
obtained by him against the defendant Shea for injuries sustained 
as the result of the operation by Shea of an automobile owned by 
Shea's cousin. The Superior Court ruled that at the time of the acci-
dent Shea was operating the automobile with the implied consent of 
its owner, the named insured under the policy. The defendant in-
surance company appealed from this ruling. 
By the statute,2 there is created a rebuttable presumption that the 
operation of an automobile, insured under a Massachusetts motor 
vehicle policy, is with the express or implied consent of the named 
person insured in such policy. In this case it was found that the named 
insured resided with Shea's family, that Shea's father and two brothers 
had general permission to use the automobile and that Shea, who was 
§14.2. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 295, 223 N.E.2d 525. 
2 G.L., c. 231, §85C. 
2
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sixteen and unlicensed, had on many occasions been permitted to turn 
the automobile around in front of his home while washing or repair-
ing it. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that by allowing Shea to 
use the car in this manner, the insured had created a bailment.s It 
was uncontradicted, however, that Shea, without the knowledge of 
the owner or of his family had a duplicate set of keys made so that 
he might surreptitiously use the automobile. It was during one such 
use that the accident occurred. In reversing, the Supreme Judicial 
Court refused to extend the general permission for limited use estab-
lished by the evidence to include use when possession of the auto-
mobile was obtained by stealth, without the owner's knowledge and 
on an occasion when it could not be said that the automobile had 
been entrusted to the operator by the owner.4 
§14.3. Property insurance: Representations and warranties. In 
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Goldstein1 the plaintiff insurance 
company sought to recover the amount paid to the defendant in settle-
ment of a theft loss under an automobile physical damage policy 
which, among other provisions, contained the following declarations: 
"Except with respect to bailment lease, conditional sale purchase agree-
ment, mortgage or other encumbrance, the named insured is the sole 
owner of the automobile, unless otherwise stated herein." The auto-
mobile insured by the defendant was stolen and the insurance com-
pany paid the insured's claim upon the receipt of a proof of loss 
which recited that "the insured was the sole owner of the automobile 
at the time of loss or damage and no other person had any interest 
therein, by bailment lease, conditional sale, mortgage, or other en-
cumbrances, except: First National Bank of Boston." In fact, the 
automobile had been stolen from its rightful owner and transferred 
to the defendant. Neither the insured nor the insurance company 
was aware of this fact when the policy was issued. When the in-
surance company learned of this fact following the loss payment, it 
initiated suit to recover the amount paid in settlement. 
The question raised by the insurance company involved the statu-
tory provision2 which prevents avoidance of liability by the company 
on the basis of a misrepresentation or warranty, unless either the mis-
representation was made with actual intent to deceive, or the matter 
misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of loss. The 
Supreme Judicial Court treated the disputed provision as a warranty 
and held that its breach materially increased the risk of loss since the 
rightful owner could retake possession whenever he might find the 
automobile and the insurer would be left with a probably worthless 
claim against the thief.s Additionally, if the owner repossessed with-
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 297, 223 N.E.2d at 527. 
4Id. 
§14.3. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 795, 226 N.E.2d 262. 
2 G.L., c. 175, §186. 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 796, 226 N.E.2d at 263. 
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out notice, the insurer might have to pay for a theft loss under 
the misapprehension that the automobile had been stolen.4 
§14.4. Homeowners insurance: Vacant or unoccupied premises. 
In Palmer v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Co.1 the defendant insurer 
denied coverage under a homeowners policy for a loss sustained by 
the plaintiff when the fluid in the hot water system froze in the in-
sured dwelling, causing the pipes to burst. The insurer relied on the 
standard provision of this type of policy which specifically excluded 
"loss resulting from freezing while the described building(s) is vacant 
or unoccupied, unless the insured shall have exercised due diligence 
with respect to maintaining heat in the building(s), or unless the 
plumbing and heating systems and domestic appliances had been 
drained and the water supply shut off during such vacancy or unoc-
cupancy." The facts were undisputed. Loss occurred while the prem-
ises, which were used only as a summer residence, were unoccupied 
and unheated. There was a hot water heating system which had not 
been drained of water. The insured, instead of draining, had on the 
advice of a licensed heating contractor, introduced into the system 
sufficient antifreeze to prevent freezing. 
The Supreme Judicial Court apparently regarded the policy re-
quirement that the "insured shall have exercised due diligence with 
respect to maintaining heat in the building" an ambiguous provision. 
Under the familiar principles requiring the strict construction of 
coverage exclusions and the interpretation of ambiguous policy pro-
visions in favor of the insured,2 the Court found coverage for the 
insured's loss by reading the exclusionary language as permitting the 
insured in the exercise of due diligence to conclude that no heat was 
required if he obtained professional advice that the use of antifreeze 
would protect the heating system against freezing.3 
§14.5. Marine insurance: Protection and indemnity policy. Two 
suits to reach and apply the proceeds of protection and indemnity 
policies were reported to the Supreme Judicial Court on statements of 
agreed facts and combined for hearing in Saunders v. Austin W. Fish-
ing Corp.1 In each case an injured member of the crew of the insured 
fishing vessel obtained a judgment against the owner of the vessel in 
an action based upon negligence under the Jones Act,2 unseaworthi-
4Id. 
§14.4. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 573, 225 N.E.2d 331. 
2Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 348 Mass. 427, 431-432, 204 N.E.2d 
273, 276 (1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.2; Joseph E. Bennett Co. v. 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 344 Mass. 99, 103, 181 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1962), noted 
in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1; Schroeder v. Federal Insurance Co., 343 Mass. 
472, 474, 179 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1. 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 575, 225 N.E.2d at 333. 
§14.5. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 224 N.E.2d 215. The companion case is Tucker 
v. Ocean Wave, Inc. 
246 U.S.C. §688 (1964). 
4
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ness, and maintenance and cure. In each case execution of the judg-
ment was returned unsatisfied by the defendant owner whose only 
asset, his fishing vessel, had sunk several years before. The policies 
which the plaintiffs sought to reach in satisfaction of these judgments 
provided: "The assured is protected and indemnified as Shipowner in 
respect of liabilities and expenses which he shall have become liable 
to pay and shall have in fact paid in respect of the vessel named 
herein for the following: - (A) Loss of life of, or personal injury to, 
or illness of, any person .... " 
The plaintiffs relied on the provision of the insurance law3 which 
denies to the insurer, under a motor vehicle liability policy or any 
other policy covering liability for bodily injury or death, the right to 
make satisfaction by the insured of a final judgment a condition 
precedent to payment by the insurer. The Court rejected the insurer's 
argument that this statute was not intended to negate the indemnity 
features of marine insurance and that the statute was enacted at a 
time when the prevailing view was that the states had no authority to 
regulate the substantive law in the field of marine insurance. The 
Court held that the types of policies in suit were clearly within the 
language of the statute which was specifically enacted to proscribe the 
use of policy provisions which relieve the insurer of liability to pay 
if the insured has not or cannot pay. Moreover, the Court observed 
that the question of the state's power to enact legislation which may 
affect marine insurance was set at rest by the United States Supreme 
Court in the Wilburn Boat case,4 in which the Court said: 
Under our present system of diverse regulations, which is as old 
as the Union, the insurance business has become one of the great 
enterprises of the Nation. Congress has been exceedingly cau-
tious about disturbing this system, even as to marine insurance 
where congressional power is undoubted. We, like Congress, 
leave regulation of marine insurance where it has been - with 
the States.5 
§14.6. Policy conditions: Assistance and cooperation. In Duggan 
v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,! Mrs. Duggan, in her own behalf and as 
3 G.L., c. 175, §1l2, provides: "The liability of any company under a motor 
vehicle liability policy, as defined in section thirty-four A of chapter ninety, or 
under any other policy insuring against liability for loss or damage on account of 
bodily injury or death, or for loss or damage resulting therefrom, or on account of 
damage to property, shall become absolute whenever the loss or damage for which 
the insured is responsible occurs, and the satisfaction by the insured of a final 
judgment for such loss or damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right 
or duty of the company to make payment on account of said loss or damage. No 
such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or annulled by any agreement between 
the company and the insured after the said insured has become responsible for 
such loss or damage, and any such cancellation or annulment shall be void." 
4 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
5Id. at 320-321. 
§14.6. 1265 F. Supp. 819 (D. Mass. 1967). As the Survey was going to press, the 
5
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administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, sought to recover 
under a liability policy issued by the defendant insurer that portion 
paid by the Duggans of a judgment obtained against them when a 
dog owned by them bit a patron of Mrs. Duggan's beauty salon. At 
the time of the biting the Duggans held two policies issued by the 
defendant, one a $10,000 premises liability policy covering the beauty 
parlor, and the other, a $20,000 comprehensive personal liability 
policy written to become effective the day before the biting. The 
Duggans gave the insurer timely notice of the biting under the 
$10,000 policy, but made no mention of the $20,000 policy which had 
been procured by Mr. Duggan and of which Mrs. Duggan had no 
knowledge. Subsequently, in satisfaction of a $30,000 judgment ob-
tained against the Duggans, the Travelers Insurance Company paid 
$10,000 and the Duggans paid the balance. The present action filed 
two years later was to recover on the $20,000 policy, which was dis-
covered by an attorney examining the Duggans' personal papers and 
upon which claim was presumably made following satisfaction of the 
judgment. 
To this suit the insurer raised the defense of breach of the Notice 
of Occurrence provision of the policy which required that "written 
notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company 
or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable." The plaintiff 
contended that the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the 
insurer to investigate promptly, and that this purpose was satisfied 
by the notice given under the other policy. The plaintiff further 
claimed that the defendant insurer did investigate promptly and was 
not prejudiced by the omission of specific reference in the notice to 
the $20,000 policy, a copy of which was undoubtedly in the files of the 
insurer. The federal district court rejected this contention, holding 
that the function of the notice was not only to alert the insurer to 
the need of prompt investigation but also to remind it of its maximum 
exposure to liability.2 The different responses of an insurer as between 
maximum limits of $10,000 and $30,000, the determination of ad-
vantageous settlement offers, the varied defenses available under dif-
ferent policies, the highly material chronology of the dog bite and 
the coincidental application for additional insurance are all matters 
of potential prejudice to the insurer. In the absence of a showing 
that the insurer waived its defense of lack of notice, the plaintiff can-
not recover. 
Peters v. Saulinier3 involved a bill to reach and apply the noncom-
pulsory provisions of a motor vehicle liability policy in partial satis-
faction of a judgment obtained by Peters against Saulinier as a 
consequence of injury sustained while riding as a guest occupant in an 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court deci-
sion. Duggan v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 383 F.2d 871 (1967). 
2Id. at 822. 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 131, 222 N.E.2d 871. 
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automobile operated at the time of the accident by the defendant 
Saulinier with the consent of the automobile owner's husband. The 
policy issued to the owner contained the standard provisions including 
within the coverage of the policy as an insured any person using the 
insured automobile, provided the actual use of the automobile is with 
the permission of the named insured or the named insured's spouse. 
The policy also required that those covered by the policy assist and 
cooperate with the insurer's defense of any insured. Following the 
accident Saulinier left at the owner's house a garage claim check for 
the demolished automobile which was thereafter sold for junk. The 
owner's husband also at this time filed with an agency office of the 
insurer a report of the accident. Thereafter Saulinier apparently dis-
appeared. 
The insurer first received notice of the plaintiff's claim approxi-
mately two months after the accident. The first report from the de-
fendant was obtained about nine months after the accident when the 
insurer's investigators, after several unsuccessful efforts, finally con-
tacted him. When the plaintiff filed suit, the insurer gave the defen-
dant certified mail notice that the case had been assigned for trial 
and informed him that if his presence in court could not be obtained, 
it would refuse to pay any verdict obtained against him. Subsequently 
its investigators talked to the defendant's parents and obtained from 
them written statements that his whereabouts were unknown. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, noting that an insurer cannot be re-
lieved of liability because of a breach of the assistance and cooperation 
clause, unless it has itself exercised diligence and good faith,4 found 
that the insurer in this case had exercised due diligence.5 In the view 
of the Court, the defendant's disappearance without notifying the 
company constituted a lack of cooperation justifying a disclaimer 
by the company after it had made reasonable efforts to secure his 
attendance as a witness at the trial.6 
§14.7. Mutual insurance companies: Investment of accumulated 
profits. Mutual fire and casualty insurance companies are specifically 
authorized under the insurance law1 to accumulate and hold profits 
in their general surplus accounts and to use such accumulation as 
needed from time to time to pay losses, expenses and dividends. Under 
the terms of the statute, accumulated profits are required to be in-
vested by the companies in the types of securities specified for the 
4Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494, 498, 156 N.E.2d 44, 47 (1959), noted in 1959 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.6. 
51967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 134, 222 N.E.2d at 874. 
6Id. 
§14.7. 1 G.L., c. 175, §80, provides in part that "any such company may accumu-
late and hold profits, but only until such profits equal four per cent of its insurance 
in force; and such accumulation shall be subject to the laws relative to the invest-
ment of the capital stock of domestic companies, except that it may also be 
invested in ... [various banking securities and deposits]. Such accumulation may 
be used from time to time in the payment of losses, dividends and expenses." 
7
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investment of the capital stock of a domestic stock insurance company. 
In Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commission of Insurance,2 
the Commissioner appealed from a declaratory decree that unrealized 
appreciation in market value of investments in common or preferred 
stocks does not constitute "profits" within the meaning of that word 
as used in the statute. The Commissioner had taken the position that 
the entire surplus of the company, including unrealized capital gains, 
must be invested in legal list securities. The Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected the Commissioner's argument, holding that unrealized appre-
ciation was no more than a "paper profit" and that, even if the stat-
ute did not permit accumulation, such a "paper profit" could not be 
distributed as a dividend or premium refund unless the securities 
were sold.3 Moreover, if unrealized capital gains are profits which 
must be invested in legal list securities, the only way this can be 
accomplished is for the company to realize the gain by selling some 
of the securities and reinvesting the proceeds. In the view of the Court, 
the surplus shown on the company's balance sheet can be separated 
into what might be called "earned surplus" and "revaluation surplus" 
and only the investment of the earned surplus is subject to the statu-
tory regulation of investments.4 
B. LEGISLATION 
§14.8. Motor vehicle insurance. The 1966 legislative struggle with 
the problem of reducing automobile insurance costs1 continued un-
abated into the 1967 session. There can be little doubt that the gen-
eral public regards automobile insurance premiums in Massachusetts 
as excessively high. In reaching this conclusion, the public makes 
little or no differentiation between that insurance made mandatory 
by statute for motor vehicle registration and the combination of 
compulsory and noncompulsory coverages2 generally purchased by the 
great majority of motor vehicle registrants. It also seems clear that 
most people think it unfair to require insureds with long periods of 
accident-free and conviction-free driving to pay the same insurance 
premiums as are required of careless or irresponsible insureds with 
known records of accident involvement and traffic law violations. 
While numerous individuals and groups of individuals have ad-
vanced various courses of action designed to bring about a reduction 
in insurance costs, few give more than token recognition to the under-
2351 Mass. 422, 221 N.E.2d 740. 
3Id. at 425, 221 N.E.2d at 743. 
4Id. at 427, 221 N.E.2d at 743. 
§14.8. 1 See 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.1l. 
2 The noncompulsory coverages include: guest coverage, extraterritorial coverage, 
higher limits of liability, medical payments, uninsured motorists' coverage, and 
comprehensive physical loss and collision coverages. See G.L., c. 90, §34A, for 
compulsory coverage required. 
8
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lying reason why Massachusetts has the highest automobile insurance 
rates in the United States. It is said that the compulsory insurance law 
breeds "claims consciousness" and exaggerated claims; that the tort 
system requires difficult determinations of who is "at fault" and 
promotes overpayment of small claims and underpayment of serious 
cases; and that court congestion and legal fees deprive claimants of 
an excessive share of claim settlements. It is also said that insurance 
companies too frequently pay "fraudulent" claims rather than incur 
excessive litigation costs and that claimants press bodily injury claims 
because insurance benefits for property damage are nonexistent or 
difficult to collect. All of these factors contribute in some measure to 
the cost of insurance, but the inescapable fact remains that Massa-
chusetts has the nation's highest insurance rates because it has the 
nation's highest accident frequency. The only known cure for the 
excessive accident frequency is driver discipline and vigorous traffic 
law enforcement. 
The 1967 legislative session gave a favorable vote in one house or 
the other to each of three basic proposals for insurance reform. The 
House of Representatives passed the so-called Basic Protection Plan.3 
This plan provides for payment to injured claimants, without regard 
to fault, for out-of-pocket expenses not otherwise reimbursed, incurred 
for bodily injury resulting from an automobile accident. It would 
eliminate payment for the first $100 of loss, for wage loss beyond 
prescribed limits, and for pain, suffering and inconvenience. Theo-
retically, the provision for payment without regard to fault coupled 
with the elimination of certain types of damages and the abrogation 
of the collateral source rule4 would decrease overall costs by making 
lawyers' services and judicial proceedings unnecessary in most cases. 
The Senate rejected the Basic Protection Plan and instead passed 
an amended version of the bill recommended by Governor Volpe5 
which would repeal the compulsory insurance law and substitute a 
financial responsibility law. This bill would require the purchase of 
uninsured motorists' coverage by those who elected to purchase in-
surance and would create an unsatisfied claim and judgment fund 
to which each uninsured motorist would be required to contribute 
an annual fee of $50. The net effect of this legislative change would 
be to transfer to those who elected to insure the cost of insuring them-
selves against loss caused by those who elected not to insure (estimated 
by the Governor and others as 200,000 or more registrants). It would 
grant to the uninsured registrant, for his $50 contribution, the right 
to drive without insurance, but would impose upon him the obliga-
tion to reimburse the unsatisfied claim and judgment fund for any 
payment made by it because of his negligent operation of an auto-
mobile. 
3 House No. 1844 (1967). See Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the 
Traffic Victim (1966). 
4 See §6.2 supra. 
Ii See 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.11. 
9
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The House of Representatives rejected the Senate bill,6 repudiated 
its earlier approval of the Basic Protection Plan and enacted, instead, 
a bill recommended by its Ways and Means Committee.7 This bill, as 
amended during floor debate, retains the present compulsory law, 
but expands its scope to include property damage liability insurance. 
It permits "competitive rating" by allowing uniform downward devia-
tion from the rates promulgated by the Commissioner of Insurance 
for the compulsory coverages; directs modification of the Motor 
Vehicle Assigned Risk Plan to penalize companies discouraging ap-
plications for insurance from selected classes of risks, and permits 
placement of bodily injury liability and property damage liability 
insurance in different companies. The bill further limits risk classifica-
tion and coverage cancellation in terms of the risk's freedom from 
accidents caused by his own negligence. 
How legislative indecision, insurance industry disunity and com-
munications media misdirection can be overcome in the interests of 
evolving a constructive compromise solution to a very real problem 
continues to be a matter of speculation. Popular unrest and the pre-
dictable political responses are almost certain to produce a very great 
increase in investigative and legislative activity on both the state and 
federal level in the next several years. Massachusetts has its own con-
figuration of problems in connection with automobile insurance, but 
public attention has been focused on the incidental difficulties, 
preserving the hope that the cost of automobile insurance protection 
can be reduced without attacking the fundamental cause of such high 
costs. 
A planS which was designed to produce a reduction in the state's 
scandalously high accident frequency by establishing a point system 
of evaluating individual driver behavior, and by providing merit rat-
ing premium reductions for the better drivers, was rejected early in 
this legislative session. A lingering hope persists that "competitive 
rating" legislation will somehow bring about a reduction in already 
inadequate compulsory insurance rates. There is a general belief 
that the elimination of "fraudulent" claims will reduce insurance 
premiums, in the hope, presumably, that the cost of fraud detection 
will not exceed the potential savings. If, however, all those injured 
claimants now entitled to loss reimbursement continue to be eligible 
for such reimbursement, the only possible way of reducing insurance 
costs is to reduce the amount of their loss which is to be reimbursed. 
Unless the number of injured claimants is reduced through a program 
of driver training and discipline coupled with strict and intelligent 
traffic law enforcement, it would appear that a reduction in the 
amount of compensated injury would be the only way to reduce 
insurance costs. 
6 Senate No. 1444 (1967). 
7 House No. 5310 (1967). 
S See House Nos. 1208, 3290, 3432 (1967). 
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§14.9. Liability insurance: Advance payments. An increasing 
number of Massachusetts insurance companies have recently adopted 
a claim settlement program designed to help injured claimants collect 
immediately a portion of the expenses resulting from motor vehicle 
accidents not caused by the claimant's negligence. Under the program, 
prompt payment of medical and other out-of-pocket expenses is of-
fered to the claimant to relieve him of the economic hardship so fre-
quently associated with the delays incident to the settlement or litiga-
tion of the tort liability question. Such advance payments are at least 
a partial answer to the advocates of the elimination of the tort lia-
bility concept as a basis for the assessment of damage in motor vehicle 
accident cases, because of the difficulty of "at fault" determinations 
and excessive litigation costs. 
Acts of 1967, Chapter 259,1 encourages such prompt payments by 
protecting the insurance company against a confession of liability and 
against multiple payments for the same loss. The act provides that 
evidence of such advance payments shall be inadmissable in the trial 
of any suit on the issue of liability or to mitigate damages. It further 
provides that if the plaintiff obtains judgment for money damages, 
the court upon motion of the defendant, shall credit against such 
judgment the amount of the advance payments. No settlement or 
partial payment made under a liability policy of a claim against the 
insured shall be construed as an admission of liability by the insured 
with respect to any claim arising out of the same event. 
§14.10. Motor vehicle insurance: Mexican coverage. Under exist-
ing laws, United States insurance companies are not permitted to write 
insurance covering an automobile while it is within the Republic of 
Mexico. Typically, automobile insurance policies confine the coverage 
afforded to the United States and Canada.1 As a consequence of this 
limitation, a person desiring to travel in Mexico by automobile must 
make arrangements to purchase insurance at the Mexican border 
through an agent of a Mexican company to cover him during his 
stay within that country. This is a troublesome nuisance in many 
cases and one that is expected to arise frequently during the 1968 
Olympic Games in Mexico City. Enabling legislation was sought 
during the 1967 session to give the domestic companies a more 
effective method of dealing with this problem inasmuch as the Mex-
ican authorities show little disposition to modify their requirements. 
Acts of 1967, Chapter 560,2 authorizes a domestic automobile in-
surance company to act as the agent for one or more Mexican com-
§14.9. 1 Adding to G.L., c. 231, new §§140B and 140C. 
§14.10. 1 The applicable condition of the Massachusetts motor vehicle liability 
policy provides: "Except with respect to [the compulsory insurance], this policy 
applies only to accidents which occur and to loss sustained during the policy 
period, while the motor vehicle is within the United States of America, its 
territories or possessions, or Canada, or is being transported between ports 
thereof .... " 
2 Adding to G.L., c. 175, new §§16OC and 160D. 
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panies as to the sale of automobile liability and physical damage 
insurance applying to the use of automobiles in Mexico by persons to 
whom the domestic company has issued such coverages in the United 
States. It further extends such authorization to any duly licensed in-
surance agent or broker. Separate accounts of such business must be 
maintained and a tax of four percent on gross premiums less return 
premiums is imposed. 
§14.11. Insurance companies: Authorized investments. Several 
statutory amendments were enacted during the 1967 SURVEY year with 
respect to investments of life insurance companies. Perhaps the most 
significant of these is Acts of 1967, Chapter 419,1 which now permits 
a domestic life insurance company to invest in the capital stock of one 
or more casualty or fire insurance companies. Such acquisitions may 
only be made with the approval of the Commissioner of Insurance, 
must aggregate not less than forty percent of the outstanding capital 
stock having voting powers, unless the Commissioner authorizes a 
smaller percentage, and the total cost of such acquisitions may not, in 
any event, exceed twenty million dollars. 
Acts of 1967, Chapter 530,2 permits a domestic life insurance com-
pany to hold fifty-one percent of the capital stock of any corporation 
as a subsidiary which is: (1) a corporation providing investment ad-
visory, management or sales services to an investment company; (2) a 
real property holding, developing, managing or leasing corporation; 
(3) a data processing or computer service corporation; or (4) any cor-
poration whose business has been approved by the Commissioner of 
Insurance as complementary or supplementary to the business of a 
domestic life insurance company. Not within the authority of this 
section are an insurance company authorized to transact a fire, marine 
or casualty insurance business, or a corporation licensed as an in-
surance agent or broker for any such insurance company. Acquisition 
for less than fifty-one percent may be approved by the Commissioner 
of Insurance. 
Acts of 1967, Chapter 254,3 removes all statutory limitations upon 
the amount of funds which may be invested by a domestic life in-
surance company in the stocks of urban redevelopment corporations.4 
The stated purpose of this legislation is "to encourage forthwith the 
investment of insurance companies in urban redevelopment proj-
ects .... " To effectuate this purpose and to emphasize the signifi-
cance which the General Court attached to this act, Chapter 254 was 
"declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public convenience." 
§14.11. 1 Amending C.L., c. 175, §66, and adding a new §66C. 
2 Amending C.L., c. 175, §66, and adding a new §66D. 
3 Amending C.L., c. 175, §§65, 66 and 66B. 
4 Authorized under C.L., c. 121A. 
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